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Fire Fatality in Maine, 1983 - 1992:  An Analysis of Who Died, When, Where, How 
and Why: What are the Implications for Fire Safety Policy in Maine? 
 
 
 The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) and the United States Fire 
Administration (USFA) provide a considerable amount of information on fire in the 
United States each year.  This analysis was conducted primarily to examine fire fatality in 
Maine and to see if the data on fire fatality for the nation provided by the NFPA and 
USFA is statistically representative of what occurred in Maine between 1983 and 1992. 
 
 The primary source of analysis was the Maine Fire Marshal’s Office fire fatality 
files for the years 1983 – 1992 with the unit of measurement being fatalities and in some 
instances (multiple fatalities) fire.  The information from these files was entered into an 
Excel spreadsheet and data comparable to what was reported by the USFA National Fire 
Data Center for the same period was then selected for statistical analysis to determine 
statistical similarity.  NFPA data on the overall trends in fire fatality for the nation was 
also compared to Maine data along with data from the U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services Center for Disease Control. 
 
 This analysis also examined fire fatality in terms of human proximity to the fires 
ignition as well as the physical and behavioral environment in both the pre and post 
ignition phases of each fire.   It is the author’s hypothesis that understanding human 
proximity factors in varying environments will provide information that will assist fire 
service personnel in choosing what remedial approaches (code enforcement, direct 
intervention, or public awareness/education campaigns) might have the greatest impact in 
diminishing the frequency of these tragedies. 
 
 Fire fatality, injury, overall fire incidence studied in combination with current and 
historical fire suppression, mitigation, public education/awareness programming and 
regulatory efforts give us a picture of the State’s fire burden in terms of societal and 
economic cost.  This analysis on fire fatality is the first topical study by the Fire 
Marshal’s Office and represents one step toward understanding the States overall fire 
burden. More topical studies will follow and become an integral part of the Fire 
Marshal’s strategic plan to assess the states fire burden on an ongoing basis.  That 
assessment will be the basis upon which the Fire Marshal’s Office shall direct all rule-
making, legislative, public education, and fire prevention policy initiatives.   
 
An analysis of fire fatality in Maine from 1993 to present is already being planned as a 
follow-up to this study.   
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Fire Fatality in Maine, 1983 - 1992:  An Analysis of Who’s Dieing, When, Where, How 
and Why: What are the Implications for Fire Safety Policy in Maine? 
 
 
Introduction 
 
“We need to know what happened.”1 
 
 The frequency and distribution of fire fatality found in the United States Fire 
Administration’s (USFA) National Fire Data Center (NFDC) and the National Fire 
Protection Association (NFPA) publications are often cited as rationale for funding local 
or regional programs aimed at fire prevention and safety.  This study will compare some 
of the more commonly used and comparable distributions from the USFA and NFPA 
with those obtained from the Maine State Fire Marshal’s fire fatality investigators files. It 
should be noted that in searching the Fire Marshal’s files of fire fatality, I discovered 
deficiencies in reporting details.  These deficiencies need to be corrected so that a more 
detailed account of the physical and behavioral environment in which a fire occurred can 
be drawn.  This is a strategic planning issue for the Fire Marshal’s Office and the fire 
service in general.  The era of assessing fires resulting in a death or injury focusing solely 
on where the fire started (origin) and what the source of ignition was (cause), as opposed 
to carefully assessing the entire physical and behavioral environment, is passing.  We 
need to look at these two environments in addition to the proximity of human 
involvement to fire ignition to better understand fire fatality and injury.  As one 
investigator put it: “We need to know what happened here.”  What happened reaches 
beyond where and how the fire starts. 
 
 
                                                 
1
 Sr. Fire Marshal’s Investigator Stewart Jacobs in an interview at the scene of a fire in 1987.  It was concluded that the 2 year-
old who died in the fire started the fire with a lighter.  FM-87-121. 
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Methodology 
 The data used to analyze Maine fire fatality in this study comes from the fire 
fatality files of the Maine State Fire Marshal’s Office that are available at the Maine State 
archives.  Each file contains the investigators’ notes from the scene and a final report that 
includes his or her findings.  The files also contain copies of depositions, affidavits, and 
interviews.  Most have the medical examiners report with photographs and many 
contained newspaper clippings.  Each item in the file served to help me understand what 
an investigator found, missed, or could not clarify in the report. 
 I conducted a literature search on research methods employed in previous fire 
fatality analyses, and relied frequently on the findings of the NFPA and USFA National 
Fire Data Center (NFDC) to establish a framework for developing a list of risk factors to 
examine in reviewing the files. 
 The control number for each report found in the State Fire Marshal Office 
(SFMO) fatality file was used as a control number in this research.  This allowed me 
when necessary, to go back to a selected file for additional review.  The primary unit of 
analysis was fatality, though fire counts were also used as a unit of analysis in some 
instances to examine multiple fatality incidences.    The major source of national data was 
the “Fire in the United States: 1983 – 1990” summary analysis reported out of the 
NFDC which used data collected from the National Fire Incident Reporting System (fire 
departments) from the year 1990.  Because the NFDC relied on state reports where not all 
the fire departments reported, there are inherent inaccuracies. 
 To get a picture of how a national organization saw the total death toll in Maine 
for the entire period, 1983 – 1992, I looked to the NFPA data.  There are acknowledged 
problems with this data.  The NFPA examines data from the National Center for Health 
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Statistics (NCHS).  The NCHS data uses death certificates from each state to establish a 
count of “fire burn” related deaths nationally.  As can be expected, there is some 
variation between the numbers the NFPA found and what was tallied from the SFMO 
fatality files. 
 In addition to quantitative analysis, I interviewed veteran fire service personnel 
for their thoughts on the patterns and distributions uncovered in this research.  In some 
instances more questions about fire fatality have been raised than answered.  These 
questions are now being used to establish a research agenda the Fire Marshal’s Office 
will establish to routinely examine Maine’s overall fire burden.  This study represents a 
beginning study of fire fatality that will be continued through to the present time.  In 
order to better understand all policy implications for the fire service in Maine regarding 
fire fatality, it is essential to look at all the  
data from 1983 to present times. 
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Maine’s Fire Burden 
 The term “fire burden” is used to summarize the social and economic costs of fire 
in a given geographic area.  The burden takes into account the overall rate and count of 
fire incidence, fatality, injury, costs of fire suppression, mitigation, public fire safety and 
prevention efforts in addition to all state and local regulatory efforts made to reduce fires.  
If you imagine the fire burden as a pyramid with five layers of fire burden, fire 
fatality would represent only a thin slice of the pyramid in terms of the number of 
incidents but a larger portion in terms of societal coast.  A true analysis of the overall fire 
burden will take an integrated examination of all the layers.  In this study we focus only 
on the fire fatality layer and the physical and behavioral environment in which they 
occur.  Within that context we’ll begin this analysis of fire fatality in Maine. 
Fire Fatality in Maine: 1983 - 1992 
Key Findings 
 Between 1983 and 1992, 216 fires took the lives of 294 individuals in the state of 
Maine.  59% of these victims were male and 41% female.  25% of these fires 
claimed more than one life. Though Maine has suffered fire fatalities since 1992 
it is critical to look back at this period for a number of reasons.   
 
 The distribution of these fatalities in terms of origin of fire, age, time and other 
variables in Maine is often statistically different from those we find at the 
national level.  The distributions differed in terms of age, origin and cause of fire, 
and time of day among other variables.  Therefore, though efforts aimed at 
reducing fire fatality in Maine may begin with an examination of national data, a 
more local perspective/analysis is required to optimize the outcome of any policy 
or plan devised to reduce the frequency of these events. 
 
 Like the nation, Maine shares a polarity of fatality in terms of the very young and 
the very old being the two most vulnerable population groups.  Males 25 to 54 
are three times more likely to die in a fire than women of the same age.  No 
females age 40 – 44 were reported to have died in a fire during the period being 
examined in this study.  
 
 90.5% of fatalities occurred in a residence fire.  Among residential fire fatalities, 
82% occurred in one and two family dwellings and contrary to the perception by 
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some in Maine’s fire service that most fatalities occur in multifamily dwellings, 
multifamily dwellings accounted for only 15.4% of the fatalities. 
 
 In Maine, 38.8% of the fatal fires in one and two family residences started in the 
living room and another 25.4% in the kitchen.   
 
 In residential settings, smoke alarms were present and operating where 10.7% of 
fatalities occurred.  In 40.5% of fatalities there was no detector and in 16.3% a 
detector was present but not operating.  In one and two family dwellings Maine’s 
did better in terms of smoke alarm performance than the nation when compared 
to NFDC data for the nation as a whole. 
 
 28.6% of fire fatalities took place in towns with fewer than 2,500 people.  59% of 
fatalities occurred in urban municipalities (defined in terms of functionality) with 
an overall mean population density of 419 people per square mile. This compares 
with the 1990 US Census that showed 22% of Maine’s population lived inside 
urban areas and 23% lived outside urban areas with the remaining 55% in rural 
areas (1990 Census, P004 Urban and Rural Universe, STF 1). 
 
 As is the case nationally, the careless disposal of smoking materials, a class 1 
fire, resulted in more fatalities than any other determinable cause.  Heating 
related fires are the second leading cause with arson and juvenile combined third. 
 
 55% of fire fatalities in Maine during the 1983 – 1992 period were class 1, 
interior proximate fires or, fires where an individual was involved directly in the 
ignition of the fire resulting in fatalities.  Those igniting the fire did not always 
die in the fire. 
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The Death Toll Trend in Maine and the State Fire Death Rate vs. Potentially 
Explanatory Population Characteristics by Maine County 
 
1.  NFPA, NCHS, & SFMO Death Toll Patterns 
Before analyzing the data let’s compare Maine’s fatality patterns as measured by 
the SFMO counts based on the investigator’s reports with those of the NFPA that uses 
National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) data.  We’ll also look at the NCHS data 
using the WISQUARS query available on-line for fire-burn related death.  The 
comparison will be made for the 1983 – 1992 period.  Figure 1 compares trends using 
these three sources to produce a line graph.   
 The pattern in terms of rising and falling counts is similar with some minor range 
variations between the three sources.  It is important to illustrate this comparison because 
the three sources are used to assess fire fatality in Maine and, hence, conclusions in terms 
of who, what, when, where and how people died in fires can vary.  The NCHS 
WISQUARS query, is death certificate data identified by the E890 – 899 range of codes 
for environmental events, circumstances, and conditions that caused a fatal injury.  It is 
available to anyone on-line at the Center for Disease Control web page.  
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 Figure 1.  Fire Fatality in Maine 
The death certificate data is compiled by states and submitted to the CDC and 
then provided to all interested parties through the NCHS.  When you examine that NCHS 
data you’ll see the total deaths for the period I studied matches exactly what I found in 
examining the SFMO fatality files.  The NFPA and NCHS data often reveal differences 
due to the omission of some arson related and vehicular fire deaths from the NCHS data. 
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T his is because NCHS has looked at vehicle deaths outside of the fire/burn related 
category and arson, because it is an intentional act, falls outside the realm of 
unintentional fire/burn related deaths.  It is easy to understand why the sources of data 
can vary when you consider the fact that nationally some arson events take multiple lives 
and many die in car fires.  Veteran fire analyst John Hall of the National Fire Protection 
Association has recommended “active fire authorities work closely with public health 
authorities to improve the accuracy of coding the possible fire deaths…” Mr. Hall also 
believes that “the consistency achieved by using a single, well-organized data base 
provides a better means to analyze patterns and especially trends than improvised 
approaches that may appear to be more inclusive.”2 
 I believe that despite the need for improvement in its reporting, the State Fire 
Marshal’s Office investigative files provide the best single source of data, particularly 
over longer periods of time, to analyze patterns and trends essential to developing policy 
aimed at reducing fire fatality.  In figure 1 the SFMO data produces a higher count than 
the NFPA.  This is because the SFMO data includes vehicle fires.  In this sense the 
SFMO files are more inclusive than the NFPA but less inclusive and are not based upon 
emergency room codes.   Respectively, the three sources produce three means for the 
period studied.  The NFPA produced a mean count of 26.8, the SFMO 29.4, and the CDC 
WISQUARS 29.4.   
2.   Fire Death Rate vs. Potentially Explanatory Population Characteristics by County in     
Maine 
 After reading the Schaenman and NFPA studies I decided to examine fire fatality  
Table 1.  Correlation Matrix Using Four Potentially Explanatory County Characteristics 
in Maine’s counties over the 1983 – 1992 period using socioeconomic characteristics 
                                                 
2
 Hall, John.  U.S. Fire Death Patterns by State: 1980 – 1996.  Fire Analysis and Research Division, 
National Fire Protection Association.  Quincy, MA: March 1999.  p. V. 
  
% Below 
Poverty 
Level 
%>25 No 
Diploma 
% Rural 
% Housing 
Built before 
1939 
Fatal 
Rate 
% Below Poverty Level 1     
%>25 No Diploma 0.683305073 1    
% Rural 0.456807554 0.38818813 1   
% Housing Built before 
1939 0.369489334 0.524529501 0.4692379 1  
Fatal Rate 0.243502533 0.224791529 0.2824905 
-
0.051717278 1 
number of observations = 16         
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often associated with fire fatality and incident risk.  Table 1 is a correlation matrix for the 
four variables considered to have a potentially high explanatory value for fire deaths.  
The characteristics used for each county included the % of population without a high 
school diploma (educational attainment); % living below poverty; % of housing built 
before 1939 and the % of the population living in a rural area.  The same correlation was 
conducted by the NFPA for the nation and showed that the education and poverty 
characteristics were highly correlated with fatality rates.3  Unlike the NFPA study none of 
the same characteristics produced strong associations for Maine’s counties.    
The percentage of the population living in a rural area in Maine does have a 
positive association with fire fatality.  This means that there is a tendency, albeit weak, 
for a county with a large percentage of population living in a rural area to have a higher 
fatality rate.  Poverty ranked second among this set of risk variables and again the 
association is positive but weak.  In the area of educational attainment the association is 
similar.  The only negative association was found between fatality rate and age of 
housing stock.  There is virtually no association between these variables but what there is 
indicates that the larger the percentage of old housing (built before 1939) the lower the 
fatality rate.  This is not what I anticipated finding.  However, if you examine the scatter 
plots for this analysis in Appendix J you’ll see that unlike the other characteristics, 
housing has few outliers in terms of the percentage of old houses.  Essentially Maine has 
old housing stock and absent any county with an unusually high-recorded percentage of 
newer housing stock, this clustering is to be expected, as is the low association between 
that characteristic and fire fatality.  Using a multiple regression model I found that the 
same four characteristics only explained 17% of variation in fatality rates.   
The model used the same older housing, educational attainment, rural area 
population, and poverty variables used in the correlation analysis previously discussed. In 
the model, table 2, the coefficients represent partial slopes.  If you assume the poverty 
level doesn’t change (is held constant), and the % living in a rural area changes, then the 
fatality rate will change by .21 per unit of change in the % living in rural areas. The t 
statistic for each of the variables was less than two, which indicates that the coefficients 
for each variable are not statistically 
                                                 
3
 Ibid.  p. 7 
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different from zero.  We can therefore accept the null hypothesis that there is no 
significant 
SUMMARY OUTPUT       
       
Regression Statistics 
     
Multiple R 0.424233453     
R Square 0.179974022     
Adjusted R Square -0.11821724     
Standard Error 0.143438946     
Observations 16     
       
ANOVA       
  df SS MS F Significance F 
 
Regression 4 0.049672 0.012418 0.603552 0.668 
Residual 11 0.226322 0.020575   
Total 15 0.275994       
       
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
Intercept 0.270173028 0.384143 0.703315 0.496476 -0.58 1.115665
%>25 No Diploma 3.084714783 5.164158 0.597332 0.56238 -8.28 14.45095
% Below Poverty Level 0.232659022 1.564233 0.148737 0.884453 -3.21 3.675515
% Rural 0.219758921 0.221026 0.994266 0.341462 -0.27 0.706235
% Housing Built before 1939 -1.21516039 1.171039 -1.03768 0.321693 -3.79 1.36228
Table 2: Regression Model 
relationship between the variables and fire fatality in this model. The p value or two-tail 
probability for each variable also confirms that the null hypothesis is acceptable. It should 
also be noted that the negative sign shown on the coefficient for % of housing built prior 
to 1939 was also negative as it was in the correlation matrix.  The fact that the direction 
of slope in terms of positive/negative for all variable coefficients in the regression model 
and in the correlation matrix did not change indicates colinearity, or variables canceling 
each other out, was not an issue.  Finally, the standard error .14 from the regression 
statistics, which is expressed in the same units as the dependent variable (fire fatality 
rate), combined with the .27 coefficient for the dependent variable indicates that the 
model overall is weak in terms of explaining fire fatality.   
 A closer look at these characteristics using census track or even block level data 
might yield stronger associations between the four characteristics used in the regression 
analysis.  Such an analysis would require drawing down the data for each town in which 
a fatality occurred.  This would draw us closer to the behavioral and physical 
environments.   
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 The fact that the model used by the NFDC revealed a stronger explanatory value 
at the national level than a similar model found at the county level in Maine suggests that 
we’re probably going to see differences in the distributions and frequencies the two sets 
of data reveal in terms of who, when, where, why, and how people died in fires.   
 
Who Died in Fires in Maine: 1983-1992 
 
1.  Age 
 
 Nationally and in Maine there is a polarity in terms of age distributions when it 
comes  
to fire fatality.  I’ll examine the distribution of fatality by age in Maine and at the national 
level and then identify some reasons why we see this distribution.  The distribution, as a 
percentage, of all fire fatalities for various age cohorts in Maine and nationally is 
illustrated in Figure 2 below. 
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 Figure 2. Percent of Fire Deaths by Age4 
   The degree of “polarity” is stronger in Maine than what we see nationally.  
Children under 14 and adults over 65 comprise 56% of fire fatalities in Maine though 
combined only makeup 37% of the population.  I ran a cross tab of fire deaths by age 
with population of the same age group for Maine and the nation (see appendix B).  The 
numbers confirmed the age dimension of fire fatality in Maine. The U.S. Census for 1990 
                                                 
4
 Figure 1 The national data was collected by the National Fire Data Center in Emmitsburg, MD and is based primarily upon 
National Fire Incident Reporting System (NFIRS) data.  The data on Maine fatalities relies strictly on the SFMO fatality 
investigations files.   
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shows that the percentage of Maine citizens over sixty-five was 13.3% while nationally 
the same cohorts made up 12.6%. People in the < 1 to age 19 age group made up 28.2% 
of the population in Maine and 28.7% nationally. Maine citizen’s sixty-five and older 
comprised 32.4% of deaths while at  national level the same age group comprised 23.3%.  
People in the < 1 to age 19 in Maine comprised 30.4% while nationally the same group 
comprised 25% of deaths.  A chi square test of this data shows that the differences are 
statistically significant.  The test revealed that the distribution of fire death in Maine by 
age, 1983 – 1992, differs significantly from those found nationwide in the NFDC data for 
fire deaths reported in 1990.  The difference was significant at the 001 confidence level.  
The null hypothesis that there is no difference was rejected. 
 Why are these groups so vulnerable and appear to be more so in Maine?  
Generally speaking there are obvious reasons for each group.  Escape is more challenging 
for older citizens than it is for those in the more youthful to early middle years of life.  
Hearing impairment or other age related disabilities or limits diminish the mitigating 
advantage smoke detection devices can have.  Failure to make a strategic evacuation plan 
can be devastating for people of this age involved in a bad fire.  Both groups rely upon 
others more so than those in the middle.  In terms of cause, NFDC data showed that 
smoking, heating and electrical distribution were the top three causes of fire death among 
the elderly.  For children under five years of age playing with fire ranked number one 
among causes followed by heating and electrical distribution.5  Comparable data for 
Maine mirrors national data with juvenile fire playing, heating and electrical being the 
top three causes for children under five.  Smoking followed by heating and electrical 
causes reported most frequently for Maine’s elderly citizens.  Looking at these events in 
terms of cause alone oversimplifies the issue.  For both age groupings class 1 (interior 
proximate), or fires where an individual was directly involved in the ignition, were 
reported most frequently.  The proximity concept, which will be discussed further in 
detail later when we focus on cause alone, provides more insight into this age 
distribution. 
   It is difficult to ascertain with any certainty why Maine experienced a more 
severe fire fatality rate than what we saw nationally during the same time frame.  A 
thorough explanation of these differing distributions and the policy implications they 
                                                 
5
 Fire in the United States: 1983 – 1990.  National Fire Data Center. Emmitsburg, MD.  12-13. 
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have will require more scrutiny of a broader time frame.  Many in Maine’s fire service, 
including the current Assistant Fire Marshal and former Portland Fire Chief have 
acknowledged that juvenile fire setting interventions began during the 1980’s due to 
some of the horrific incidents occurring at the time.  However, the problem was not as 
clearly understood as it is today and institutional buy-in by the education and human 
services communities were not immediate.  Yet the impact of these developments cannot 
be explained sufficiently absent an examination of fatalities occurring in the years 
following this study.  An understanding of the policy implications for today will require 
searching in a broad time frame for answers.  
2. Gender 
As is the case nationally more males (59%) die in fires in Maine than females (41%).  
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 Figure 3: Fatalities by Age/Gender 
Figure 3 illustrates the age distribution.  Notice the gap between females and males 
between the ages of twenty-five and fifty-four.  The leading cause of fire death in this age 
grouping for both sexes was smoking with heating and cooking following.  All three of 
these causes can be proximate, or class 1 fires, as opposed to the distributions we see 
among the very young and old where there were definite proximate causes mixed with 
causes such as electrical which are, with rare exception, class 2 interior non-proximate 
fatal where no individual was directly involved in the ignition.  Class 1, interior 
proximate fires are those fires where an individual was directly involved in fires ignition 
while Class 2, non-proximate fires are those where no one was present at the place of 
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ignition.  Common Class 1 fires include but are not limited to arson, juvenile firesetting 
and the accidental self-ignition of clothes that occur when an individual reaches over an 
open flame on a stove.  Falling asleep with a cigarette is also a common Class 1 fire.  
Class 2 fires would include, but are not limited to the malfunction of equipment such as 
an oil heater in a trailer.  Class 3, exterior proximate would be outdoor fires where, for 
instance, an individual attempted to jump start a fire to burn brush with gas and in the 
process set themselves on fire. The use of these classifications in future studies will 
require a more focused topical examination of aggravating circumstances such as alcohol 
use.  
With regard to fatalities by gender that there appears to be a particularly large gap 
in the 25 to 55 age range.  The gap, illustrated in figure 4, accounted for one-fifth of fire 
fatalities between 1983 – 1992. 
Figure 4.  The Gender Gap 
3.  Regional Differences 
 Though this might appear more pertinent in the examination of where fatalities 
occurred, I wanted to include it here because there are regional attributes or 
characteristics associated with people from different parts of the State.  Figure 5 simply 
ranks, from lowest at the top to highest at the bottom, the counties of Maine by fire 
fatality rate.     
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Figure 5.  Fire Fatality Rate by Maine County 1983 - 1992 
 
Where People Died in Fires in Maine 
1.  Types of Property 
The distribution of fire death in terms of property type verifies what the majority 
of fire service personnel already know.  Most fatal fires occur in the home and in  
Figure 6.  Fire Fatality by General Property Type 
particular, one and two family dwellings.  This long understood reality has considerable 
policy implications.  Figure 6 on the previous page illustrates the distribution of fire 
fatality by general property type in Maine and the nation (NFDC).  This concentration of 
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fatalities in residential dwellings is something seen in national, state and regional data.  
However, as Figure 6 illustrates, Maine’s distributions by property type differed 
significantly from those uncovered at the National Fire Data Center (see appendix C).  
Looking at national data I found fewer residential fatalities, as a percentage, than I found 
in Maine.  Maine is a rural state with the seventh oldest housing stock in the nation and 
most structures are residential.6  Maine does not have as many areas with a higher 
concentration of public assemblies and in such areas they experience more catastrophic 
disasters such as the Station House fire in Rhode Island that can skew fatality numbers.  
Finally, the large metro areas with more traffic volume also see a considerably larger 
number of fire fatalities occurring in vehicles.   
2.  Residential Fire Fatality 
 I wanted to examine Maine residential fire fatalities in terms of construction 
materials.  When collecting available data from the Fire Marshal’s files I broke 
construction type into three 
categories: masonry, wood frame, 
or mobile home.  This revealed an 
issue Maine firefighters and fire 
protection engineers have been 
discussing at length for many 
years.  The pie graph, figure 7, 
breaks residential fatalities down  
  Figure 7 Construction Type 
into the three types of construction.  A considerable number of Maine’s homes are mobile 
homes that have a history of burning fast and hot.  The absence of any exterior covering 
below floor line and the highly combustible materials used in the interior, low ceilings 
and lack of adequate egress, all work to accelerate fire and decrease the opportunity for 
survival.  The mobile home issue will be a topic of more focused analysis at a later time. 
In looking at the distribution of residential fire fatality by number of family 
dwellings in Maine I found that they were similar to those we find nationally (see 
appendix D).7  One or two family dwellings accounted for 82% of the residential 
                                                 
6
 U.S. Census 2000 
7
 The National Fire Data Center separates mobile homes from single-family dwellings.  I separate them 
when examining construction type but combine them when the focus is on fatalities by number of dwelling 
Maine Fire Fatality by Residential Construction 
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fatalities in Maine with 15% occurring in multi-dwelling structures or apartments.  Some 
in the fire service may have anticipated a higher percentage of fatality in the multi-
dwelling structures.  Maine’s legislature has considered and passed proposals to enforce 
more stringent regulations that would require additional sprinkler system coverage 
(suppression) or additional smoke detector placement (mitigation) in an effort to reduce 
injury and fatality in these structures.  This is another area where a more focused analysis 
would be helpful.  Historically the periodic push for more stringent regulation might be 
driven more by the emotions surrounding multiple fatality events that can and do occur in 
multi-family dwellings.   
Finally, with regard to overall fire fatality by dwelling, it was found that 
approximately 53% of fatalities occurred in structures that were owned properties with 
40% being rental properties.  Drawing economic data from the SFMO Fire Fatality 
Investigators files was extremely difficult but this ratio of ownership to rental properties 
might provide clues as to the impact of income on fire fatality.  In addition, the 
proportion of fatalities taking place in a rental building is out of proportion with the 
actual ratio of rental to owned homes in Maine.  The implications are considerable 
however when you look at Maine policy regarding multi-family units.  Legislation has 
required sprinkling some of these latter facilities as well as the installation of smoke 
detectors all based upon number of units.  If only 15.4% of fatalities occurred in multi-
family units, presumably rental, it is questionable if the policy which was intended to 
reduce the incidence of fatality, injury, property loss, and suppression costs to fire 
departments has been less effective by focusing on the number of units instead of 
ownership.  20% of the single- family dwellings experiencing a fatality were rented.  
86.4% of the two-family dwellings were rented.  There were a total of 196 single-family 
units in the study and 22 two family.   In the universe of 1 and 2 family rented dwellings 
where a fatality occurred, the risk of fatality in a rented two-family unit, or duplex, 
appears to exceed that of a rented single-family unit.  Overall however, the risk of a 
fatality occurring in an owned single-family dwelling is still higher than any other type of 
dwelling.  This reality is understandable given the actual proportion of homes owned to 
those rented.     
                                                                                                                                                 
units.  For the chi test that indicated no difference between the national and state distributions, in terms of 
number of dwellings, I combined single NFDC % of single- family fatalities with mobile homes. 
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3.  Room of Fire Origin:  Where the Fire Started 
 Figure 8.  All Residential Fatal Fires in Maine by Room of Origin  
Where in the structure a fire starts tells us a lot about the physical and behavioral  
environment in which these events occur, and collectively perhaps, something about 
“Mainers” lifestyles in addition to other health related issues.  We’ll compare the national 
distributions in one and two family dwellings to those we found in Maine. 
To obtain the data in figures 8 and 9 I sorted out fires and deaths, residences, 
number of family dwellings and room of fire origin.  Figure 8 shows that fatal fires in 
Maine started most frequently in the living room followed by the kitchen and then the 
bedroom.  There were a total of thirteen different rooms of origin counted.  In the NFDC 
analyses, the room most frequently found to be the room of origin was the living room or 
“lounge” area as it is called in  NFDC analyses.  An examination of cause of fire ignition 
will give us a better understanding of this distribution.  Figure 9 illustrates the 
distribution of fatalities in only one and two family dwellings by room of fire origin for 
Maine and the nation.  There were a total of 163 fires in these dwellings that account for 
224 deaths or 76% of total fire fatalities in the given period.  
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 Figure 9.  Distributions of Fatalities by Room of Origin In 1&2 Family Units 
Note the distribution differences between Maine and what I found nationally.  The 
most considerable difference comes in the “other” rooms where the top three areas 
included the entry, basement and unknown/undetermined areas with the basement 
ranking first on that list.  Not one of these areas amounts to even half of the fires I found 
to have started in the bedroom, living room or kitchen.  The chi square test comparing 
these distributions indicates that there is a significant difference between what we see 
nationally as opposed to what is seen in Maine (see Appendix E).  In both distributions 
the lounge or living room area were found to be the primary area of origin.  In the kitchen 
area however I found a difference not only in terms of percentages but rank as well.  
Nationally the kitchen area ranks third behind lounge and bedroom but in Maine the 
kitchen area ranked second.  When I examine fire cause and in particular proximity to fire 
and cause by age we’ll better understand these distributions.  The cause of most fires 
originating in the living room is the careless disposal of smoking material.  Aggravating 
factors such as alcohol and age can combine to create scenarios where someone falls 
asleep ignites the recliner or sofa and in the post ignition phase, and in particular where 
no alarm was set off, successful escape was inhibited. 
4.  Fatalities in Urban, Suburban, and Rural Areas and by Population Count and    
     Population Density 
 The discussion over what is rural as opposed to urban has moved beyond the mere 
number of persons in a given area.  For the purposes of this study Maine’s State Planning 
Office courteously provided me with a breakdown of towns defined as urban, suburban or 
rural based upon the following characteristics: 
a. An urban area serves a basic urban function, i.e. center for jobs and 
services for people living in the region; 
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b. Town’s classified as suburban were in close proximity to urban areas, 
showed fast housing/population growth, and were losing there natural 
resource base and industries/economic activity associated with that base; 
c. Finally, rural areas were those remote from urban areas and still 
possessing that basic natural resource base and a level of natural 
resource based economic activity. 
With these characteristics in mind the towns where the fatalities occurred were 
divided into the three 
areas for fire fatality 
using the newer 
definitions, and 
illustrated in figure 
10.   
Figure 10.  Fire Fatality by Area Function 
Census data for 1990 showed that 55.4% of the population lived in rural areas with 
22.9% outside urban areas and the remaining 21.7% inside urban areas.  Using the newer 
definitions 53% of Maine’s towns are classified as rural areas (where 18% of fatalities 
occurred), 24% classified as suburban (where 18% of fatalities occurred) and 21% 
classified as urban (where 64% of fatalities occurred).  The long term policy implications 
of looking at data about fire fatality in urban and rural areas over a long period of time 
using the newer definitions are important for the following reason. The number of fire 
departments that existed in the 1980s is less than what we have today.  As these 
departments have gone the areas they serviced now rely on another department that in 
turn expands that departments service area.  Though it will require a more focused 
analysis, this expanded service area might impact the number of mutual aid agreements 
between existing departments.  A department in a town that might not be considered 
urban under traditional definitions is urban under the new definition by virtue of its 
functionality.  The decision to close a fire department has been largely a decision made at 
the local level.  However, that decision process might be more cost effective if it is based 
upon a larger area and the fire suppression, fire safety and prevention programming needs 
of that larger area.  A more in depth analysis examining the service needs of a larger area 
as opposed to the economic needs of a single town may be a better approach for policy 
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makers in the public safety venue when they consider what department to close or where 
to relocate or build a new facility.  
The fire service refers to “The Rural Fire Problem” as it has been identified in 
research literature.  Nationally, the mortality data taken from the 1983 – 1987 indicates 
that the death rates for rural areas were significantly higher than those in non-rural areas.  
The same analysis also found that the distributions of fire fatality by age and gender 
were, to a degree, similar to those of non-rural areas.8  Another study frequently cited for 
its conclusion that the fire fatality rate in rural areas was “2-1/2 times the non-rural rate” 
focused more specifically on cause, in terms of physical environment.  This study 
concluded that “heating fires produced by far the largest rural fire fatality rate.”  The 
improper installation or misuse of solid fuel burning heating equipment was “found to be 
the most significant rural fire problem.”9  
Figure 11 provides us a break down of the frequency of fire fatalities and fatal 
fires by town population. 
  Figure 11.  Fire Fatalities and Fatal Fires by Town Population In Maine 
  As you can see conclusions about fatality nationally seem to hold true in Maine as 
well.  The range in terms of size is considerable but the distribution resembles the pattern 
we read about in studies conducted nationwide.  By nature such analysis, as will be 
                                                 
8
 The Rural Fire Problem in the United States.  Federal Emergency Management Agency, USFA.  
Emmitsburg, MD.  1997.  pp. 4, 15, & 44.  This study defined rural using the USDA Beale Codes which 
were matched with NCHS mortality data since both contained FIPS coding.  NFIRS data were linked to the 
USDA set using the FIPS code for each FDID (Fire Department Identification number).  The Beale Codes 
7, 8, & 9 used county population count in combination with proximity to a metropolitan area.  The range of 
population was < 2,500 to 19,999 all not adjacent to a metro area. 
9
 Gomberg A. and Clark L. “Rural and Non-Rural Civilian Residential Fire Fatalities in Twelve States.”  
(NBSIR # 82-2519) U.S. Department of Commerce, National Bureau of Standards Center for Fire 
Research.  Washington, DC: 1982, p. 36.  This study used population count alone in determining what was 
rural.  Areas with < 2,500 people were considered rural.   
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discussed in further detail, becomes more distant from the behavioral and physical 
environment in which these events actually occur. 
Figure 12 provides the reader with a different view of the distribution of fatal fires 
using a scatter plot to examine frequency by population density.  As you can see the 
higher frequency of fatal fires occurring in areas with lower population density is evident.   
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  Figure 12.  Fatal Fires by Population Density 
 Finally, rural fire fatality in a state like Maine will require additional analysis the 
results of which will have to be carefully weighed when considering any course of action 
to reduce these counts.  As one study in particular indicates effective code enforcement in 
rural areas is a challenge.10  Complicating matters in rural areas is the more limited fire 
suppression capacity.  In addition, direct intervention programs to address issues such as 
juvenile fire setting or more general public awareness/education programs, designed to 
address the behavioral side of fire fatality are expensive.  Because populations in rural 
areas may continue to diminish, these same areas may also experience reduced tax 
revenues, and the financial resources needed to deliver adequate suppression, fire 
prevention and safety programs or interventions may become scarce.  Ironically, because 
these areas collectively experience more fatal fires and a higher percentage of fatalities 
they may be in more need of such programs.  In essence all three of the traditional 
approaches employed to reduce fatalities or the coordination thereof become virtually 
impossible.  Consideration also needs to be given to potential tax policy changes that 
might reduce revenues and expenditures at the municipal and state level.  Some of these 
                                                 
10
 Clark, F.E. “Firesafety in Rural America.”  Fire Journal.  July 1982. 
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changes may have the effect of ratcheting down spending regardless of the efficiency, 
fairness of equitability of the tax policy.11  
 
When People Died in Fires in Maine 
 
1.  Residential Fatal Fires by Time of Day 
 
 To understand and reduce fire fatalities or injuries it is critical to determine when 
the events occur most frequently.  Figures 13, 14 and 15 illustrate when fatal fires occur 
by hour of day, day of the week, and month of the year for Maine and the nation.  You 
can see that in Maine and nationwide there are similar low and higher frequency periods.  
In terms of hour of days, Maine’s pattern is less consistent than what we see nationally.  
There are spikes and peak times which appear to be more toward the waking hours as 
  Figure 13.  Residential Fire Fatalities by Hour of Day for Maine and the Nation 
opposed to those nationally that occur more frequently at the early morning or sleeping 
period.   
In figure 13 are notes describing a veteran firefighter’s thoughts and analysis of 
fatalities by hour.  Referring primarily to the post-ignition phase of a fire, former Portland 
Fire Chief Joseph Thomas differentiated fires in which no escape effort was made as 
                                                 
11
 Maine’s TABOR, “An Act to Create a Taxpayer Bill of Rights” could have a similar impact.  The 
TABOR in Maine could rachet down spending because expenditure and revenue ceilings are defined in 
terms of the previous year’s amount of spending and revenue.   During a poor economic period spending 
and revenue will likely drop and set the level of both for the next year.  However, the TABOR does have 
mechanisms for increasing both revenues and expenditures.   
0.0%
2.0%
4.0%
6.0%
8.0%
10.0%
12.0%
12
am
 
-
 
1a
m
1a
m
 
-
 
2a
m
2a
m
 
-
 
3a
m
3a
m
 
-
 
4a
m
4a
m
 
-
 
5a
m
5a
m
 
-
 
6a
m
6a
m
 
-
 
7a
m
7a
m
 
-
 
8a
m
8a
m
 
-
 
9a
m
9a
m
 
-
 
10
am
10
am
 
-
 
11
am
11
am
 
-
 
12
pm
12
pm
 
-
 
1p
m
1p
m
 
-
 
2p
m
2p
m
 
-
 
3p
m
3p
m
 
-
 
4p
m
4p
m
 
-
 
5p
m
5p
m
 
-
 
6p
m
6p
m
 
-
 
7p
m
7p
m
 
-
 
8p
m
8p
m
 
-
 
9p
m
9p
m
 
-
 
10
pm
10
pm
 
-
 
11
pm
11
pm
 
-
 
12
am
Maine % NFDC %
Early morning "entrapment" 
fatals 1 - 3am
Fatals resulting from f ires starting much 
earlier w ithout victim know ing.  5 - 7am
 23
opposed to those where entrapment, or failed escape, took place.  Chief Thomas 
hypothesized that because so many individuals were found in bed in fires occurring in the 
waking hours that the fire itself likely started much earlier and burned slowly.  The “slow 
burners” as they’re described killed the victim as high levels of CO, heat, and smoke built 
up in the structure.  No escape was attempted.  In the early morning, or what for some is 
the bedtime hours, victims were often found out of bed apparently in transit to egress.  
Data looking at the position of were the body was found can be troublesome due to levels 
of destruction and other variables that would inhibit motion such as a disability or alcohol 
abuse.  The position of body data should be cross referenced with time of fire, age, and 
aggravating circumstances such as smoking, alcohol and the presence of mitigation 
systems (alarms, detection) to better test the slow burn hypothesis.12 
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 Figure 14.  Residential Fire Fatality by Day of Week for Maine and the Nation 
 An examination of residential fatalities by day of week, Figure 14, verified that 
the Maine and national distributions are similar (see appendix F).  Finally, let’s look at 
fatalities by the month of the year. 
                                                 
12
 There is mounting evidence that smoke alarms do not work as well as hoped with the very young or 
elderly. 
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 Figure 15.  Residential Fire Fatality by Month of the Year 
There is a definite seasonality to fire fatality in Maine and across the nation.  Fire 
deaths are distributed most frequently in the winter months and this is, of course, 
attributed to heating problems.  This national distribution is somewhat skewed however 
due to the higher fatality rates of the southeast where the cold weather doesn’t actually 
set in until the winter months and people begin to use woodstoves and other solid fuel 
burning apparatus without conducting the proper safety and maintenance checks.  In 
Maine we see the cold setting in earlier and the use of woodstoves and heating equipment 
commences in mid to late fall or October and November.  Notice that October is Maine’s 
third highest month for fatalities.   
Though the distribution of fire deaths nationally and in Maine by month appears 
similar, a closer look at the two distributions reveals that there is a statistically significant 
difference (see appendix G).  In Maine the months of October, November, and December 
vary the most from what is happening nationally.  Maine’s worst month was December 
followed by January.  These two months accounted for 31% of the fatalities over the 
given time period.  This distribution in Maine suggests that there is a flipside to the 
experience hypothesis of working with heating equipment mentioned previously.  The 
fact that people are indoors for a longer portion of the year in Maine may in fact lead to a 
higher level of risky behaviors or carelessness.   
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The holiday season, Thanksgiving-Christmas-New Years, also augments the level 
of risk occurring during the winter months.13  Summer July 4th celebrations have a similar 
impact though fatalities at this time are often outdoor related events. 
The Cause of Fires Resulting in Fatality 
 As already indicated the cause of any fire resulting in a fatality is complex and 
involves a combination of physical and behavioral variables.  For the sake of this analysis 
of cause I looked specifically at the “ignition factor” as opposed to the aggravating 
circumstances, fuel sources, or cause factors all of which play a critical role in each 
tragedy. 
 In examining each fire fatality file I assigned each fire to one cause in a list of the 
top six causes discussed predominantly in the literature (see Table 2).  These causes 
included: heating, cooking, electrical, smoking, arson, juvenile fire setting (play), and 
undetermined.  Often juvenile fire setting and arson are combined and categorized as 
intentional.  There are anomalies that comprise “other” in the data set though, as you’ll 
see, that count is small. 
1.  Overall and Residential Fatalities by Cause 
 In figure 16 you can see the distribution of all fatalities by cause.  As you can see 
the leading cause is not a surprise.  Smoking accounts for 23% of all fatalities in the 
selected period.  Smoking is a class 1, proximate fire preventable primarily by behavioral  
 Figure 16.  All Fatalities by Fire Cause in Maine 
 
                                                 
13
 There was only one fatal incident involving a Christmas tree during the 83 – 92 period record in the 
SFMO files.   
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modifications though mitigation and suppression systems would help reduce deaths in the 
post-ignition phase of a fire.  One effort underway in Maine to reduce the numbers of 
fatal fires caused by the careless disposal of smoking materials is to restrict the sale of 
cigarettes to only “Fire Safe” brands. 
A host of anti-smoking and fire safety organizations have been pursuing the “Fire 
Safe” brands effort for some time.  In fact, according to the National Burn Foundation, 
Congress first looked at the fire safe cigarette in 1929.14  Since that time legislation has 
been introduced numerous times and is currently pending at both the state and federal 
level.  New York did enact a “fire safe” cigarette law that took effect in 2004.  The 
impact of this legislation is being watched closely at the state and federal levels.  The 
other leading known causes of fires resulting in a fatality overall, excluding 
undetermined, were heating followed by electrical.  Both of these latter causes are 
primarily non-proximate incidents. 
Figure 17 compares Maine’s distribution of residential fatalities by fire cause with 
the nation.  Smoking still ranks first in Maine followed closely by heating and then 
electrical.  You’ll notice that two of the top three causes in Maine, heating and electrical, 
are primarily class 2, non-proximate fires though juvenile and cooking related fires, 
frequently class 1, proximate fires, follow.  This suggests that remedial approaches 
targeted at a particular 
0.00%
5.00%
10.00%
15.00%
20.00%
25.00%
30.00%
35.00%
Hea
ting
Ele
ctric
al
Coo
king
Smo
king Arso
n
Juv
en
ile F
ire S
ettin
g
Und
ete
rm
ined
Ano
ther
Maine % NFDC %
 Figure 17.  Residential Fatals by Cause of Fire in Maine and the Nation 
                                                 
14
 American Burn Association, Fire-Safe Cigarette Legislative Update, 2002.   
www.ameriburn.org/advocacy/fireSafeCig.htm 
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cause and associated behavior, i.e. smoking or juvenile fire play/setting, or more stringent 
regulatory efforts requiring that new homes be constructed with sprinkler systems might 
have a better outcome.  An example of the former approach would include the NFPA’s 
Fire Prevention Week campaign held annually that focuses on specific fire themes such 
as the 2006 cooking fire theme.  Because such an approach attempts, indirectly at least, to 
modify behavior, they may not be as effective as a code requiring sprinklers that in 
essence remove the human behavioral element from the equation.  The critical feature of 
the sprinkler system is that it eliminates, to a considerable extent, the impact of such 
causal factors as careless behavior or misuse in addition to mechanical failures (heater 
malfunctions).  Like the “fire safe” cigarette, the idea of requiring sprinkler systems is 
being considered more seriously than ever particularly since the 2006 NFPA Life Safety 
Code has incorporated requirements for sprinkler systems in all new one and two family 
dwellings.  Finally, figure 17 may also be interpreted as indicating Maine does a better 
job in determining the cause of fatal fires than investigatory agencies across the nation as 
a whole do.   
Maine’s distribution of residential fatalities by fire cause is not statistically similar 
to what is found nationally.  As you can see from the chi square test below, the 
distributions are significantly different.  
Table 3 
 
Chi Test on Residential Fatalities by Cause of Fire in Maine to That Found Nationally 
 Maine % NFDC % Actual Expected Difference 
Sq. 
Difference Sq./Exp. 
Heating 22.2% 10.8% 59 29 30.3 916.4 31.9 
Electrical 11.7% 6.5% 31 17 13.7 188.0 10.9 
Cooking 9.8% 6.5% 26 17 8.7 75.9 4.4 
Smoking 22.6% 18.0% 60 48 12.1 146.9 3.1 
Arson 4.5% 13.1% 12 35 -22.8 521.9 15.0 
Juvenile Fire 
Setting 10.5% 6.0% 28 16 12.0 145.0 9.1 
Undermined 10.2% 30.2% 27 80 -53.3 2844.3 35.4 
Another 8.6% 8.9% 23 24 -0.7 0.5 0.0 
   266 266   109.7 
Source: Figure 72, Causes of Residential Fire Deaths--1990 
p. 70, Fire in the United States: 1983 – 1990. 
 
 
.05/95% CL  .001/99.9 level 
Chi Sq. Value  109.7   109.7 
DF   7   7 
Critical Value  14.07   24.32 
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The difference might best be explained by looking at these incidents in terms of 
proximity to fire ignition. 
Proximity and Fire Fatality 
Over the period of measurement, the United States has a much worse record in 
fire fatalities in comparison with European nations.  In the effort to explain this contrast, 
and fire fatality in general, more careful research was conducted during the 1970’s.  
Perhaps the most frequently cited analysis was done in 1977 by Philip Schaenman.  His 
publication on Procedures for Improving the Measurement of Local Fire Protection 
Effectiveness focused on socioeconomic and demographic data and its use in analyzing 
and improving fire department effectiveness.15  Schaenman’s paper fostered more critical 
examinations of fire incidents using aggregate data on educational attainment, poverty, 
rural/urban and age of housing stock factors. 
However, in 1996 Charles Jennings, a doctoral student at Princeton produced a 
dissertation focused on conceptualizing the role played by socioeconomic factors and 
their complex relationship to the more immediate physical and behavioral environment in 
which these events occur.16  Jennings believed that an attempt to model or predict the 
incidence of fire that “relies solely… on socioeconomic indicators without regard for in-
depth and local investigation will yield at best only a limited theoretical understanding of 
fires.”17  From that study a model using the variable of proximity to fire ignition was 
developed for use in analysis and, indirectly, designing fire incident, injury, and fatality 
reduction efforts.  It was with that model in mind that this present analysis was 
conducted.  It is critical to remember that this level of analysis would essentially require 
heightened awareness during the investigation process.  As previously described, each 
fire in this analysis was defined and coded as follows: 
Class 1: An interior proximate fire.  Proximate meaning the person was proximate 
to the fires ignition.  These include arson and juvenile firesetting events 
but may also include heating, smoking, and cooking fires. 
                                                 
15
 Schaenman, Philip. Procedures for Improving the Measurement of Local Fire Protection Effectiveness.  
National Fire Protection Association and Urban Institute: Boston (1977). 
16
 Socioeconomic Factors and The Incidence of Fire.  Federal Emergency Management Agency, USFA, 
Fire Data Center.  FA 170/June 1997, pp 1 – 7;  Jennings, Charles R. Urban Residential Fires: An 
Empirical Analysis of Building Stock and Socioeconomic Characteristics for Memphis, Tennessee.  
Unpublished doctoral dissertaton, 1996, pp. 105 – 107. 
17
 Jennings, p 117. 
 29
55%
40%
5%
Class 1: Interior Proximate Class 2: Interior Not Proximate
Class 3: Exterior Proximate
Class 2: An interior non-proximate fire.  Non-proximate meaning the individual 
was not proximate to the fire’s ignition.  Most heating and electrical fires 
are class 2 fires. 
 Class 3:          An exterior (outside) proximate fire.  Outside proximate fire that would        
include what we often hear of today as “wild land” fires started by an 
intentional burn or by a juvenile playing with fire, etc. 
In examining each fire fatality file I assigned each fire to one of the three classes. 
The pie chart below, Figure 18, represents the distribution of fire fatalities in Maine by 
the proximity of individuals to the fires ignition where determined.    You can see from 
the chart that few fatalities in 
our total count of 294 were 
outdoor events.  Among those 
that did occur in a structure, 
an individual was proximate 
to the ignition 55% of the 
time.  When you add the class 
3 fires to class 1, 60% of fires 
involve people in the ignition 
process.  This finding has  
 Figure 18:  Fatality Distribution by Individual Proximity 
considerable ramifications in the selection and design of fire safety and prevention 
approaches.  Class 2 fires are most effectively addressed through code enforcement, 
social and housing policies, and changing economic conditions because they are 
commonly associated with the mechanical failure of heating devices or the improper 
installation of the same.18  Class 2 fires come primarily within the purview of the SFMO 
who is a leader in establishing statewide laws, rules and policy.  However, the SFMO 
code enforcement efforts focus on public assemblies, licensed day cares, assisted living 
homes and the like.  Local code enforcement officers and fire department officials are in 
a better position to address the application of standards to residential dwellings.  They are 
the primary enforcers of the codes adopted by the SFMO at the local level and must apply 
codes that are, at a minimum, meeting or exceeding standards set by the SFMO.  
                                                 
18
 The February 2006 Limestone fire, killing three, was likely due to an improper installation of a 
woodstove.   
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Effective code enforcement depends upon the public financial resources that, at the local 
and state levels, are limited.  In addition, the issue of local control can have a mitigating 
impact on codes being enforced as well.  Code enforcement officers at a local level have 
closer ties to the local community and its local builders and other contractors.  This 
pressure at the local level combined with, in some instances, limited resources makes it 
difficult for the local code officials to become familiar with National Fire Protection 
Association Standards/Codes which are the most frequently incorporated fire standards in 
the State of Maine.  In addition, the State Planning Office in Maine that helps train code 
enforcement officers has focused primarily on land use issues.  Finally, the lack of one 
code as opposed to having to use a combination of BOCA and NFPA codes in the 
construction inspection business has not helped local officials. 
 Class 1 & 3 fires, comprising the largest percentage of fires, can be addressed 
through public education, awareness or direct interagency collaborative intervention.  The 
parties involved in code enforcement as opposed to education/awareness approaches 
usually differ.  Code enforcement is public and involves law enforcement while 
education/awareness can be more inclusive and bring a set of community players to the 
table.  Also, education and awareness efforts can address more directly mitigation and 
suppression issues that can save lives in homes regardless of the human proximity 
element because they focus on both the pre- and post-ignition behavioral and physical 
environment as well as strategy. 
A question 
that 
frequently 
arises is 
“how do the 
proximity 
classes 
breakdown 
by age?”  
Figure 19  
 
Figure 19. Proximity by Age 
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gives us that breakdown.  Because class 1 fires are associated more with the two 
vulnerable populations I broke the distribution into three groupings including the young 
(<19), middle (19-64), and the old (65+).  I expected to see the distribution for the 
vulnerable groups more prominent in the class 1 category but in fact I found that this 
class of fires leading for all three groups.  However, based upon this observation it could 
be interpreted that among the younger age group the distribution between class 1 and 2 
fatalities is more random than what we see among the middle and older age groups. 
Finally, a complete analysis of proximity used to determine what approach to use 
in reducing fire fatality must incorporate the overall rate of fire incidence by cause as 
well the number of incidents resulting in injury and property loss amounts (the fire 
burden).  Absent that incorporation the real costs and benefits of directed resources 
cannot be determined. 
The Distribution of Fire Fatality by Age and Cause 
 Since the very young are most at risk in a fire, lets look at frequency by age and 
cause for these groups to see where fires associated with certain levels of proximity are 
distributed.  Figure 20 represents the distribution of fatalities by cause for individuals 
below age 15. 
< 15 Cause
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 Figure 20:  Fire Fatality by Fire Cause for Individuals below Age 15 
 You can see in Figure 20 the disturbing level of fires in which juveniles are 
involved in the ignition process.  Figure 21 below provides the distribution of fatalities by 
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 Figure 21: Fire Fatality by Fire Cause for Individuals Over 65 
cause for older citizens.  For older citizens smoking, a proximate event, takes the largest 
toll followed by heating. This is a considerable find when you consider Maine’s 
increasingly aging population, the estimated numbers who smoke and the states older 
citizens living at or below poverty.  These factors considered in combination with the 
percentage of people living alone in rural areas and the age of the housing stock they live 
in raise significant multi-agency policy questions.19  In Maine and nationally I found that 
there is an indisputable trend toward delivering health care to older citizens at home as 
opposed to the traditional, and more tightly regulated, institution such as the nursing 
home. There are indisputable benefits to the aging at home philosophy in terms of quality 
of life but there are indisputable risks as well.20   
 Finally, though heating is often considered non-proximate, with the older 
population that is not always the case.  Cooking and heating accidents often are the result 
of an accidental self-ignition.  Some older Maine citizens have attempted to get the fire 
going sooner with an accelerant.  The results have been unfortunate.  In other cases an 
individual has simply allowed dangling clothing to ignite while tending to the wood in a 
stove or food on a range. 
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 State Profiles: Reforming the Health Care System (Flowers, Gross, Kuo & Sinclair, 2005) American 
Association of Retired Persons, Public Policy Institute; Across the States:  Profiles of Long-Term Care 
(Gregory & Gibson, 2002)  AARP, Public Policy Institute. 
20
 Use of oxygen, delivered to the home of an elderly individual has smoking resulted in 4 fatalities since 
2002. 
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The Use of Alcohol and Smoke Alarms in Fire Fatalities in Maine 
1.  Alcohol Use  
Because alcohol use and age have been shown to diminish the effectiveness of 
smoke alarms, a mitigation component, it warrants attention.21  There were a total of 51 
fires where alcohol 
was involved and 70 
people died in those 
fires.  Figure 22 
provides you with 
the distribution by 
percentage of  
 Figure 22.  Alcohol and All Fire Fatalities 
fatalities.  As you can see 24% of all fatalities in this category occurred where someone 
who lost their life tested at or above the legal limit for being considered too impaired to 
drive.  It should be pointed out that because an individual is counted among those who 
died in an alcohol related fire incident it does not mean that individual had been drinking.  
Some were victims of others who had been drinking.  However, regardless of whether the 
individual started the fire, the person who has been drinking will likely have more 
difficulty escaping the fire.  Alcohol and drug use play a role in both the pre- and post-
ignition phases of the fire regardless of cause. 
2.  Smoke Alarm Performance 
 In looking at smoke alarm performance I looked only at the 266 fatalities   
 Figure 23.  Residential Smoke Alarms Performance in Maine 
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  Home Smoke Alarms (Public/Private Home Safety Council) 2006. 
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occurring in a residence since such devices are not present in vehicles or outdoors and the 
major focus on smoke alarm use and analysis has been the home.  Figure 23 on the 
previous page provides an illustration of smoke detector performance in residential 
structures in Maine during the period of this study.  SFMO investigators determined there 
were no alarms over 30% of the time.  They also determined they were present over 45% 
of the time even though the operational status was unknown or determined as not 
operating.  The efficacy of smoke alarm distribution programs is debatable.  Many 
programs simply distribute the alarms at school fairs, country fairs and other public 
events.  Researchers began wondering whether or not they were actually brought home 
and installed.  And if they were, were the batteries replaced?  These questions and the 
evaluation methods for such programs are discussed quite often.22  In the 1990’s a new 
public awareness campaign focusing on replacing at the time we set our clocks ahead in 
October.  It will be interesting to see what impact associating this critical yearly battery 
change with a specific annual, and high profile event, will have in the long term 
Since the majority of fatalities in Maine occurred in one and two family dwellings 
I decided to compare national distributions of fire alarm performance in those units to 
what I found in Maine to see if the distributions were similar.  Figure 24 provides us that 
visual comparison.  The distribution of fire alarm performance by fatality in one and two 
family  
10.7%
35.8%
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 Figure 24.  Residential Smoke Alarms Performance in 1 & 2 Family Dwellings 
dwellings in Maine is not similar to what we find nationally though the overall patterns 
are similar (see Appendix I).  The total presence of a smoke detector/alarm at both the 
                                                 
22
 Ibid.  Home Smoke Alarms 
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national level and in Maine is dismal though Maine does better with a cumulative 27% 
presence between 1983 and 1992 in contrast to the national 17%.   
Maine’s performance in terms of operational alarms however is slightly poorer, 
proportionately, than what we see nationally.  The graph illustrates why the issue of 
smoke alarms has moved beyond simply “having them” to “having them operational.”  
The best solution to this problem is of course to have them hardwired into the home at the 
time of construction, or if possible, after.  Recent efforts to acquire funding for smoke 
alarms in states are generally alarm installation programs but many fire departments and 
other organizations are unwilling to install the alarms due to concerns about liability.  
Nationally we see more alarms in multifamily dwelling occupancies than in single-family 
dwellings.  This is due in part to laws requiring them.  In 1985 Maine began requiring 
smoke alarms be installed in both single and multifamily dwellings.23    
The efficacy of such a laws depends upon local resources needed to enforce them.  
A tenant in an apartment in Maine can contact the Fire Marshal’s Office for resolution of 
such issues if there is no local authority to attend to the problem.  For the single-family 
dwellings, where most die, the critical time for resolution is at the time of construction 
and that is a local issue.  Again, efforts focused on presence alone may not have the 
impact of those focused on operation.  In the future the language of statutes and 
regulations will likely reflect this shift and we’ll see the move toward hard wired  or 
inter-connected alarm systems which notify people on various levels of a structure or 
area, i.e. the bedroom, kitchen, upstairs, etc.   
 Finally, as previously indicated the effectiveness of an operational smoke alarm 
will vary depending upon aggravating circumstances such as age, alcohol or drug use.  
People who have consumed too much alcohol might not wake up.  In addition, 
researchers have also discovered that young children simply do not respond to alarms like 
adults and elderly individuals are going to exit more slowly despite ample warning.  
Blocked exit routes can reduce the impact of alarms for all ages as well. 
Conclusions 
 With some exceptions, the distribution of fire fatality in Maine is not statistically 
similar to what we found nationally.  An examination of those fatalities in terms of 
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 25 MRSA §2464 requires the owner to “install,…, not less than one approved smoke detector upon or 
near the ceiling in areas within, or giving access to, bedrooms in…”  single family units constructed after 
1985 and all apartments and multifamily dwellings. 
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human proximity to the fire ignition reveals that in Maine at least, over half of the victims 
died due to careless and direct contact with fire.  This would suggest that efforts focused 
on behavioral modifications or intervention as opposed to code enforcement might 
produce better long-term outcomes in the area of fatalities. 
 Maine’s population distribution by age reflected the pattern in the nation.  In 
Maine and across the nation young and older individuals are our most vulnerable 
populations.  However, as a percentage of total fatalities Maine’s vulnerable populations, 
in particular the elderly had a more severe experience.   I referred to the high percentages 
of fatalities among the young and old as the “age polarity of fire fatality.”  In this sense 
there was an age dimension to fire fatality.  It should be noted that for middle-aged 
people, Maine experienced lower rates of fatality by five-year age groupings in contrast 
to the nation and males experienced most of those fatalities in Maine.  I referred to this 
middle aged male fatality anomaly as the “gender gap” in fire fatality.  Most fire fatalities 
in Maine resulted from fires that began in the living room or as it referred to nationally, 
the lounge area. The citizens of Washington County experienced the highest rate of fire 
fatality per one thousand people during the period of this study. 
 In terms of when people died in fires in Maine as opposed to the nation I again 
found differences with the exception being the day of the week.  Maine’s October and 
December fatality levels were considerably different from what I found nationally.  By 
hour of fatal fire, Maine’s experience is more severe during the pre-waking to waking 
hours as opposed to the nations experience with early morning hours. 
When I looked at cause I found what a consensus of people from the fire service 
and injury prevention community know, the careless disposal of smoking related 
incidents kill more people than any other ignition factor, followed by heating apparatus-
related causes.  I also found a higher than expected count of deaths due to juvenile fire 
activities.  When I looked at cause by age and proximity I found that 1 – 4 year olds died 
more as a result of a juvenile fire setting incident/cause than any other cause.  The other 
most vulnerable population, elderly, died most often as a result of smoking and heating 
related incidents. 
 Fire fatality in Maine during this period was clearly a residential issue with the 
majority of those residences being one and two family occupancies.  This finding runs 
counter to what I often hear from individuals in the fire service.  The perception that 
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multiple family dwellings are the problem doesn’t take into account the actual 
distribution of fire death by number of dwelling units in Maine.  In terms of population, 
Maine was like the nation where more fatalities occurred in areas with a low population 
that is traditionally thought of as being rural.  These same areas also have a low 
population density.  However, in terms of town, service center area function (see figure 
10) most fatalities occurred in towns defined or classified as being urban areas.  Looking 
at Maine’s distribution of fire fatalities based upon where the fire started (room of origin) 
in one and two family dwellings I found that more deaths were the result of fires starting 
in the living room as opposed to the bedroom as I found nationally.   
 Maine’s record of smoke alarm performance was, as it was nationally, dismal 
though the distributions in terms of presence and operating status were not statistically 
similar.  Maine had more operational and non-operational detectors in structures where 
people died than I found nationally and a lower percentage of dwellings without 
detectors.   Alcohol was counted as a factor in 24% of the fatalities in Maine during the 
period of this study.   
 Unlike most studies of fire fatality I looked at where people were at the time of 
the fire’s ignition.  In doing so I discovered that over half of those who died in fires died 
as a result of carelessness.  This unfortunate reality was verified when I examined 
fatalities in terms of cause and age suggesting, as previously stated, that approaches other 
than code enforcement might have better outcomes.   
 Finally, I wanted to compare what the NFPA found when it took variables it 
considered to have a high explanatory value for fire fatality in states across the nation to 
Maine’s counties.  Data on educational attainment, poverty level, rural count, and age of 
housing were used.  At the national level these variables in combination explained 47% 
of fire fatality rates but in Maine at the county level they explained only 17%.  The 
variable showing the most significant positive association in Maine was the percentage 
living in a rural area.  Age of housing stock showed a negative relationship to fire fatality. 
Policy Implications and Suggested Further Research 
 Given the conclusions identified above one can conclude fire fatality is a 
behavioral issue and that the greatest policy implication for the Fire Marshal’s Office and 
fire service would be that the policy emphasis needs to shift from regulation to public 
awareness/education and intervention programs.  However, it should be noted that to 
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fully evaluate policies this study can only represent a beginning of that evaluation 
process.  Combining this analysis with another focused on fire fatality from 1993 to 
present must be conducted for the following reasons. 
Since the 1980’s there have been changes made to the fire safety code, and 
legislation addressing fire safety in Maine.  Manufactures have made attempts to use non-
combustible materials in the production of furniture as opposed to more combustible 
materials previously used.  The number of older mobile homes that contain the aluminum 
wiring that caused some fires has likely diminished as a result of national legislation.  
Programs such as juvenile fire setting interventions also started in the 1980’s.  Public 
awareness programs attempting to get people to change the batteries in their smoke 
alarms when daylight savings time begins were initiated during the 1990’s.  Also, 
Maine’s distribution of the elderly population has increased since the time of this study 
and the State maintains a higher than national average of fire fatality among the elderly 
age cohorts.  Because all these changes have occurred since the 1980’s additional 
analysis covering a longer period of time would provide more valuable information.  Just 
as fire fatality has a seasonal dimension, time is a variable that influences the behavioral 
and physical environment in which these tragedies take place.   
New consideration also needs to be given to other state agencies approaches to 
housing, health and education and how they are changing and have changed over an 
extended period of time. With elderly service agencies now emphasizing aging at home 
models and the accompanying policy of delivering health care to these people at home, 
the fire service and in particular the SFMO is going to have to work closely with the 
Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) as well as the Maine State Housing 
Authority (MSHA) and other associations advocating for elderly citizens to integrate fire 
safety awareness and education into newly emerging routines of social service 
programming.  It might be wise to carefully consider codes that address such issues as the 
delivery of oxygen tanks to elderly citizens who are also receiving home health care 
through DHHS licensed caregivers. 
 If the level of juvenile fire incidents continues to be the leading cause of fire death 
among young children, the SFMO in particular may wish to work with the Department of 
Education (DOE) and DHHS in the same way suggested above, but focus the education 
and awareness on children.  There is considerable opportunity here given the fact that the 
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number of public elementary school pre-k programs operating is at an all time high 
increasing 700% since the latter 1990’s. 
Policy Options 
1. Regulatory 
Two devices that could be introduced through rule-making would be the 
mandatory installation of sprinkler systems (suppression) or, hardwired or interconnected 
dual level smoke detector systems (mitigation) at the time of construction.  Sprinklers to 
some extent remove the human element from the scenario by slowing or extinguishing a 
fire, as well as confining its spread, to a given area.  This could save lives or provide 
more time for egress.  Likewise, smoke alarms and detectors also provide additional 
egress time particularly if they are interconnected at all levels of the home.   
 
Primary consideration needs to be given to the issue of enforceability.  It is certain 
the Fire Marshal’s Office can not enforce such a regulation statewide.  Additional help 
from fire departments and local code enforcement officers will help but the extent of that 
assistance is difficult to ascertain.  It is highly unlikely that a regulatory approach can be 
adequately enforced so as to reduce the number of fatalities. 
 
2.  Public Education/Awareness and Making Fire Safety a Desired Choice  
 Integrating injury prevention programs focused on children, as opposed to a 
separated approach covering a variety of child related injuries might make child fire 
prevention and safety education more deliverable to the growing number of pre-k and 
kindergarten teachers in public schools.  Reaching the children at an early age in an 
organized fashion as part of a health care curriculum might contribute to a culture of 
safety in the long term as opposed to brief awareness efforts that have been delivered 
primarily by the fire service working with schools in a random effort.  
 To address fire fatality among the elderly in Maine the Fire Marshal must 
collaborate, cooperate, and coordinate with the local area agencies on aging, Maine’s 
Bureau of Elderly Services, AARP and other organizations to bring fire safety awareness 
programs to this audience.  Again a key element to success would be to merge programs 
already focusing on elderly issues such as falls prevention, into an integrated and routine 
program. 
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 The State Fire Marshal and the fire service must learn from other public safety 
organizations how it can make fire safety a consideration when Maine citizens’ purchase 
a home or products for a home such as furniture.  Just as heating costs, proximity to 
schools, and other issues determine what choices people make in the purchase of a home, 
so to should mitigation (smoke alarms systems), means of egress or escape in times of 
emergency, and eventually even sprinkler systems. 
3.  Intervention 
 Given the number of fire fatalities resulting from children playing with fire or 
setting a fire, particularly in the 1 – 4 age cohort, a protocol for direct intervention needs 
to be considered.  Even if the number juvenile fire play related fatalities declines but the 
number of incidents remains steady, an interagency approach to this problem would be 
appropriate.  Fire service personnel working with members from the human services, and 
mental health, and education communities need to work on this protocol to discern 
situations of serious danger that require the work of specialists from those situations 
where a more general educational approach will minimize or eliminate any future 
dangers. 
 Finally, to truly understand risk levels, we need to take fatality, injury, and 
incidence data along with suppression and regulatory costs in one model.  More recent 
studies on fire fatality include data on overall incidence to assess the real risk.24  Absent 
such data we can only assess risk based upon the distributions we see among fatalities.  In 
addition, investigation of fires needs to move beyond the realm of origin and cause and 
extend itself into the bigger physical and behavioral environment essential to truly 
understanding these complex events.  Who and how many people were home, how many 
dwellings were there in the given structure, what were their ages, and a host of other 
questions need to be asked and answered clearly as part of the routine investigation.  If 
that is done then the investigators statement: “We need to know what happened” can be 
answered to the benefit of the greater public good. 
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 Runyan, C., Bangdiwala, S.I., Linzer, M.A., and Sacks, J.J.  “Risk Factors for Fatal Residential Fires”  
New England Journal of Medicine, 327 (1992), 859-863 
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Appendix A 
Chi Test on Fatality by Age in Maine compared to that found nationally. 
 ME % 
National 
% Age Actual Expected Difference 
Sq. 
Difference Sq./Exp. 
1 16.7% 13.7% <4 49 40.1 8.9 78.5 1.96
2 7.2% 4.9% 5-9 21 14.4 6.6 44.1 3.07
3 2.4% 2.5% 10-14 7 7.3 -0.3 0.1 0.01
4 4.1% 4.4% 15-19 12 12.9 -0.9 0.8 0.06
5 7.2% 6.7% 20-24 21 19.6 1.4 1.9 0.10
6 6.1% 6.9% 25-29 18 20.2 -2.2 4.9 0.24
7 5.5% 7.1% 30-34 16 20.8 -4.8 23.1 1.11
8 4.1% 7.2% 35-39 12 21.1 -9.1 82.7 3.92
9 1.7% 6.0% 40-44 5 17.6 -12.6 158.3 9.00
10 3.4% 4.0% 45-49 10 11.7 -1.7 3.0 0.25
11 4.1% 4.8% 50-54 12 14.1 -2.1 4.3 0.30
12 2.4% 3.8% 55-59 7 11.1 -4.1 17.1 1.53
13 2.7% 5.0% 60-64 8 14.7 -6.7 44.2 3.02
14 5.1% 5.1% 65-69 15 14.9 0.1 0.0 0.00
15 5.5% 5.0% 70-74 16 14.7 1.4 1.8 0.12
16 6.5% 4.6% 75-79 19 13.5 5.5 30.5 2.26
17 7.5% 4.1% 80-84 22 12.0 10.0 99.7 8.30
18 7.8% 4.5% 85+ 23 13.2 9.8 96.3 7.31
        42.58
Source: Figure 37, Percentage of Fire Deaths, by Age—1990 
p. 43, Fire In the United States: 1983 – 1990, USFA Fire Data Center, 8th Edition. 
 
   .05/95% CL  .001/99.9 level 
Chi Sq. Value  42.58   42.58 
DF   17   17 
Critical Value  27.59   40.79  
 
 
Appendix B 
 
 Maine Pop ME Deaths ME %Deaths ME % TL Pop US Pop US %TL Pop % US Deaths 
<1 14,567 8 2.7% 1.2% 3,217,312 1.3%  
1-4 71,155 41 14.0% 5.8% 15,137,131 6.1% 13.70% 
5-9 88,506 21 7.2% 7.2% 18,099,179 7.3% 4.90% 
10-14 84,579 7 2.4% 6.9% 17,114,249 6.9% 2.50% 
15-19 87,927 12 4.1% 7.2% 17,754,015 7.1% 4.40% 
20-24 86,040 21 7.2% 7.0% 19,020,312 7.6% 6.70% 
25-29 98,773 18 6.1% 8.0% 21,313,045 8.6% 6.90% 
30-34 106,462 16 5.5% 8.7% 21,862,887 8.8% 7.10% 
35-39 101,866 12 4.1% 8.3% 19,963,117 8.0% 7.20% 
40-44 91,479 5 1.7% 7.4% 17,615,786 7.1% 6.00% 
45-49 69,043 10 3.4% 5.6% 13,872,573 5.6% 4.00% 
50-54 55,708 12 4.1% 4.5% 11,350,513 4.6% 4.80% 
55-59 54,216 7 2.4% 4.4% 10,531,756 4.2% 3.80% 
60-64 54,234 8 2.7% 4.4% 10,616,167 4.3% 5.00% 
65-69 50,835 15 5.1% 4.1% 10,111,735 4.1% 5.10% 
70-74 40,765 16 5.5% 3.3% 7,994,823 3.2% 5.00% 
75-79 31,701 19 6.5% 2.6% 6,121,369 2.5% 4.60% 
80-84 21,846 22 7.5% 1.8% 3,933,739 1.6% 4.10% 
 42
85+ 18,226 23 7.8% 1.5% 3,080,165 1.2% 4.50% 
 1,227,928 293   248,709,873   
 
Appendix C 
 
Chi Test on Fire Fatality by Property Type in Maine to that Found Nationally 
 ME % National% Actual Expected Difference 
Sq. 
Difference Sq./Exp. 
Residence 90.5% 72.0% 266 212 54 2950.7 13.9
non-residence (not vehicle/outside) 3.1% 6.0% 9 18 -9 74.6 4.2
vehicle 3.7% 18.0% 11 53 -42 1757.3 33.2
outside 2.7% 2.0% 8 6 2 4.5 0.8
   294 288 6 52.1
Source: Figure 44, General Property Types—1990 Fire Deaths 
p. 48, Fire In the United States: 1983 – 1990, USFA Fire Data Center, 8th Edition. 
 
   .05/95% CL  .001/99.9 level 
Chi Sq. Value  52.1   52.1 
DF   3   3 
Critical Value  7.81   16.27  
 
Appendix D 
 
Chi Test on Residential Fire Fatality in Maine by Residential Dwelling Type to that Found Nationally 
    ME % NFPA% Actual Expected Difference Sq. Difference Sq./Exp. 
Dwellings (1 & 2 Fam) 82.0% 77.0% 218 205 13 173.7 0.8
Apartments (multifam) 15.4% 20.1% 41 53 -12 155.4 2.9
other   2.6% 2.9% 7 8 -1 0.5 0.1
     266   3.8
Source: Figure 68, Residential Fire Deaths by Property Types—1990 
p. 67, Fire in the United States: 1983 – 1990, USFA Fire Data Center, 8th Edition. 
 
    
.05/95% CL  .001/99.9 level 
Chi Sq. Value  3.8   3.8 
DF   3   3 
Critical Value  5.99   13.82  
 
The null hypothesis that there is no difference between distributions is accepted here.  The distribution 
of fatalities in 1 & 2, apartment or multi-family dwellings are essentially the same with differences 
due to sampling or random variations. 
 
 
Appendix E 
 
Chi Test on Rooms of Fatal Fire Origin in Maine to that Found Nationally 
 Maine % 
NFDC 
% Actual Expected  Difference 
Sq. 
Difference Sq./Exp. 
Lvgrm 38.8% 31.9% 87 71 16 242 3.38 
Kitchen 25.4% 14.6% 57 33 24 590 18.05 
Bdrm 14.7% 23.8% 33 53 -20 413 7.74 
Other 21.0% 29.7% 47 67 -20 381 5.73 
 100.0% 100.0% 224 224 0 0 34.90 
Source: Figure 111, Leading Rooms of Origin for Deaths in One-and Two-Family Dwellings—1990 
p. 98, Fire in the United States: 1983 – 1990, USFA Fire Data Center, 8th Edition. 
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   .05/95% CL  .001/99.9 level 
Chi Sq. Value  34.9   34.9 
DF   3   3 
Critical Value  7.81   16.27 
 
 
Appendix F 
 
Chi Test on Fire Fatality by Day of Week in Maine to that Found Nationally 
 ME 
Maine 
% NFDC Expected Difference 
Sq. 
Difference Sq./Exp. 
Sunday 44 16.5% 16.5% 43.9 0.1 0.0121 0.00 
Monday 30 11.3% 13.4% 35.6 -5.6 31.854736 0.89 
Tuesday 27 10.2% 13.0% 34.6 -7.6 57.4564 1.66 
Wednesday 33 12.4% 13.0% 34.6 -1.6 2.4964 0.07 
Thursday 39 14.7% 12.6% 33.5 5.5 30.074256 0.90 
Friday 35 13.2% 14.9% 39.6 -4.6 21.473956 0.54 
Saturday 58 21.8% 16.5% 43.9 14.1 199.0921 4.54 
Source: Figure 92.  Residential Fire Deaths by Day of Week—1990 
p. 86, Fire in the United States: 1983 – 1990, USFA Fire Data Center, 8th Edition. 
 
   .05/95% CL  .001/99.9 level 
Chi Sq. Value  8.6   8.6 
DF   3   3 
Critical Value  12.59   22.46 
 
Appendix G 
 
Chi Test on Fire Fatality by Month of the Year in Maine to that Found Nationally 
Month Maine NFDC actual expected Difference 
Sq. 
Differ Sq.Diff/expected 
January 14.0% 13.9% 37 37 0 0.03 0 
February 7.2% 10.6% 19 28 -9 82.63 3 
March 9.1% 8.7% 24 23 1 0.89 0 
April 6.8% 8.4% 18 22 -4 18.15 1 
May 6.4% 6.0% 17 16 1 1.21 0 
June 6.0% 5.8% 16 15 1 0.40 0 
July 6.0% 4.8% 16 13 3 10.76 1 
August 3.0% 5.6% 8 15 -7 46.79 3 
September 6.4% 4.8% 17 13 4 18.32 1 
October 11.7% 8.0% 31 21 10 96.04 5 
November 6.4% 10.3% 17 27 -10 105.99 4 
December 17.0% 13.0% 45 34 11 111.30 3 
Source: Figure 90, Residential Fire Deaths by Month—1990 
p. 85, Fire in The United States: 1983 – 1990. 
 
 
.05/95% CL  .001/99.9 level 
Chi Sq. Value  21   21 
DF   11   11 
Critical Value  19.68   31.26 
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Appendix H 
 
Chi Test on Fatalities by Cause of Fire in Maine to That Found Nationally 
 Maine % NFDC % Actual Expected Difference 
Sq. 
Difference Sq./Exp. 
Heating 22.2% 10.8% 59 29 30.3 916.4 31.9 
Electrical 11.7% 6.5% 31 17 13.7 188.0 10.9 
Cooking 9.8% 6.5% 26 17 8.7 75.9 4.4 
Smoking 22.6% 18.0% 60 48 12.1 146.9 3.1 
Arson 4.5% 13.1% 12 35 -22.8 521.9 15.0 
Juvenile Fire 
Setting 10.5% 6.0% 28 16 12.0 145.0 9.1 
Undermined 10.2% 30.2% 27 80 -53.3 2844.3 35.4 
Another 8.6% 8.9% 23 24 -0.7 0.5 0.0 
   266 266   109.7 
Source: Figure 72, Causes of Residential Fire Deaths--1990 
p. 70, Fire inThe United States: 1983 – 1990. 
 
.05/95% CL  .001/99.9 level 
Chi Sq. Value  109.7   109.7 
DF   7   7 
Critical Value  14.07   24.32 
 
Appendix I 
 
Chi Test on Fatalities and Smoke Detector Performance in Maine to that Found Nationally  
 Maine  
NFPA 
% Actual Expected  Difference 
Sq. 
Difference Sq./Exp. 
Present/not 
operating 16.30% 8.3% 35 18 17 294 16.5 
no detector 40.50% 47.2% 87 101 -14 210 2.1 
present/operated 10.70% 8.7% 23 19 4 18 1.0 
unknown 32.60% 35.8% 70 77 -7 49 0.6 
   215  0 0 20.2 
Sourc:  Figure 114, Smoke Detector Performance in One- and Two-family Dwellings Fire Deaths—
1990 Page 103, Fire in the United States: 1983 – 1990. 
.05/95% CL  .001/99.9 level 
Chi Sq. Value  20.2   20.2 
DF   3   3 
Critical Value  7.81   16.27 
 
Appendix J 
 
Table of Potential Explanatory Characteristics by County & Fatality Rate 
Residual and Line fit plots for each of the four characteristics 
 
 
% 
Below 
Poverty 
Level 
%>25 
No 
Diploma % Rural 
% Housing 
Built before 
1939 
Fatal 
Rate 
Franklin 12.5% 8.0% 85.5% 36.4% 0.07 
Androscoggin 11.4% 8.9% 32.1% 39.0% 0.10 
Knox 11.9% 8.8% 67.4% 46.0% 0.11 
Waldo 16.0% 8.8% 81.3% 36.0% 0.18 
Cumberland 8.0% 6.4% 41.4% 32.9% 0.20 
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Kennebec 10.2% 7.5% 48.6% 32.1% 0.22 
Somerset 14.5% 10.7% 67.8% 39.3% 0.22 
Lincoln 9.6% 8.5% 100.0% 39.2% 0.23 
Penoboscot 13.0% 8.2% 46.6% 32.4% 0.23 
York 6.8% 7.9% 50.3% 30.4% 0.23 
Hancock 10.0% 7.3% 79.9% 37.0% 0.30 
Piscatiquis 15.2% 10.1% 83.5% 36.8% 0.32 
Aroostook 14.5% 8.3% 58.1% 33.2% 0.35 
Sagadahoc 7.2% 8.2% 52.4% 34.0% 0.45 
Oxford 12.5% 8.9% 84.0% 39.6% 0.48 
Washington 19.3% 9.8% 91.0% 39.7% 0.54 
All raw data was taken from the 1990 Census Summary files.   
 
 
SUMMARY OUTPUT       
       
Regression Statistics 
     
Multiple R 0.424233453     
R Square 0.179974022     
Adjusted R Square -0.11821724     
Standard Error 0.143438946     
Observations 16     
       
ANOVA       
  df SS MS F Significance F 
Regression 4 0.049672 0.012418 0.603552 0.668 
Residual 11 0.226322 0.020575   
Total 15 0.275994       
       
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
Intercept 0.270173028 0.384143 0.703315 0.496476 -0.58 1.115665
%>25 No Diploma 3.084714783 5.164158 0.597332 0.56238 -8.28 14.45095
% Below Poverty Level 0.232659022 1.564233 0.148737 0.884453 -3.21 3.675515
% Rural 0.219758921 0.221026 0.994266 0.341462 -0.27 0.706235
% Housing Built before 1939 -1.21516039 1.171039 -1.03768 0.321693 -3.79 1.36228
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